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Cybersecurity

The threat analysis: assets, threats, attack paths and security goals.

On this page: asset · damage-scenario · threat · attack-path · security-goal

A threat analysis and risk assessment (ISO/SAE 21434): assets, damage scenarios, threats and attack paths (rated, checked and typeset by archec — archec tara), and security goals (Arche requirements of category security).

asset#

A cybersecurity asset (ISO/SAE 21434 TARA): something worth protecting — a message, a function, a key, the data of a part — and the properties of it an attack can break. Checked and typeset by archec (archec tara); Arche has no place for it yet.

  • Keywords: asset
  • Set: safety, security & design space
  • Where: top level
  • Syntax: asset Id "What" { of element; properties integrity, availability }
Property Value Meaning
description text Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX.
of element name The element (part, port, link, message…) it is.
properties refs The cybersecurity properties at stake.
tags list of tag names Tags.
asset AS-BRAKE "Brake commands" { of Car.adcu.can_brake; properties integrity, availability }

damage-scenario#

A damage scenario: what happens to the road user when a property of an asset is broken, rated by impact category (severe, major, moderate, negligible). Its impact is the worst of its ratings.

  • Keywords: damage-scenario
  • Set: safety, security & design space
  • Where: top level
  • Syntax: damage-scenario Id "What happens" { asset AS-…; property integrity; safety severe; financial …; operational …; privacy … }
Property Value Meaning
description text Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX.
asset asset name The asset harmed.
property confidentiality | integrity | availability | authenticity | authorization | non-repudiation The property broken.
safety severe | major | moderate | negligible Impact on safety.
financial severe | major | moderate | negligible Financial impact.
operational severe | major | moderate | negligible Operational impact.
privacy severe | major | moderate | negligible Impact on privacy.
damage-scenario DS-BRAKE "Unintended full braking on the motorway" { asset AS-BRAKE; property integrity; safety severe; operational major }

threat#

A threat scenario: how an attacker brings a damage scenario about, through which entry point and from how far (vector). Its risk (1–5) comes from the impact of what it damages and the feasibility of its easiest attack path; its CAL from the impact and the vector. A risk of 4 or 5 needs a treatment, and reduce a security goal.

  • Keywords: threat
  • Set: safety, security & design space
  • Where: top level
  • Syntax: threat Id "How" { damages DS-…; stride spoofing; via element; vector network; treatment reduce; goal CSG-… }
Property Value Meaning
description text Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX.
damages list of damage scenario names The damage scenarios it leads to.
stride spoofing | tampering | repudiation | disclosure | denial | elevation Its STRIDE category.
via element name The entry point: the element the attack goes through.
vector network | adjacent | local | physical From how far: network (remote), adjacent (radio, a shared bus), local (a port on the car), physical (hands on the part).
treatment reduce | avoid | share | retain What is done with the risk: reduce (security goals), avoid (remove what makes it possible), share (contract, insurance) or retain (a claim says why).
goal list of requirement names The security goals that reduce it.
claim text Why a retained or shared risk is acceptable.
threat TS-SPOOF "Spoofed brake commands on the chassis CAN" {
  damages DS-BRAKE
  stride spoofing
  via Car.chassis_can
  vector adjacent
  treatment reduce
  goal CSG-01
}

attack-path#

An attack path: the steps an attacker takes to carry a threat out, rated for attack potential (ISO/SAE 21434 annex G): elapsed time, expertise, knowledge of the item, window of opportunity and equipment. The points add up to the feasibility: 0–9 high, 10–13 medium, 14–19 low, 20 and more very low.

  • Keywords: attack-path
  • Set: safety, security & design space
  • Where: top level
  • Syntax: attack-path Id "How" { threat TS-…; step "…"; elapsed week; expertise proficient; knowledge restricted; window easy; equipment specialized }
Property Value Meaning
description text Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX.
threat threat name The threat it carries out.
step text One step of the attack (repeatable).
elapsed day | week | month | half-year | beyond Time it takes: day (≤ 1 day), week, month, half-year (≤ 6 months), beyond.
expertise layman | proficient | expert | multiple-experts Expertise it needs.
knowledge public | restricted | confidential | strict Knowledge of the item it needs.
window unlimited | easy | moderate | difficult Window of opportunity.
equipment standard | specialized | bespoke | multiple-bespoke Equipment it needs.
attack-path AP-OBD "Frames injected from the diagnostic port" {
  threat TS-SPOOF
  step "Plug a CAN adapter into the OBD port"
  step "Replay a captured BRAKE_CMD"
  elapsed week
  expertise proficient
  knowledge restricted
  window moderate
  equipment standard
}

security-goal#

A cybersecurity goal: the top-level security requirement answering threats, with its CAL (cybersecurity assurance level, CAL1–CAL4; derived from its threats when not written, and one written lower is reported). Written to Arche as a requirement of category security.

  • Keywords: security-goal
  • Set: safety, security & design space
  • Where: top level
  • Syntax: security-goal Id "Title" { text "…"; answers TS-…; cal CAL3 }
Property Value Meaning
description text Prose description. $…$ and $$…$$ are LaTeX math; a ```latex block is kept as LaTeX.
text text What shall hold.
answers list of threat names The threats it answers.
cal CAL1 | CAL2 | CAL3 | CAL4 Its CAL, when decided elsewhere.
tags list of tag names Tags.
security-goal CSG-01 "Brake commands are authentic" { text "The brake ECU shall act only on brake commands from the ADCU."; answers TS-SPOOF }